A Shift in the U.S.-Israeli Drama, June 09

publication date: Jun 29, 2009
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author/source: Stratfor
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A Shift in the U.S.-Israeli Drama

June 25, 2009

Stratfor


A meeting that had been scheduled this week in Paris between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and George Mitchell, the U.S. special envoy to the Middle East, was canceled Wednesday.

Netanyahu's spokesman said the meeting was called off so that the Americans and Israelis could have more time to "clarify some issues." But Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot then published a report citing an unnamed Israeli official, who said the U.S. administration had sent the following "stern" message to Netanyahu: "Once you've finished the homework we gave you on stopping construction in the settlements, let us know. Until then, there's no point in having Mitchell fly to Paris to meet you."

The U.S. explanation for the scrapped meeting was much tamer: State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said Netanyahu and Mitchell had canceled the meeting so that Mitchell could meet first with Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak next Monday in Washington. It is still unclear who canceled on whom, but the Israelis seem intent on giving the impression that the Americans are the ones being unreasonable.

Tensions in the U.S.-Israeli relationship can be traced to the post-election crisis in Tehran.

To understand this, we need to rewind to June 4 in Egypt, as U.S. President Barack Obama attempted to reach out to the Muslim masses and distinguish his policies in the region from those of George W. Bush. In that speech, Obama focused on the Israeli-Palestinian issue for several reasons. First, by generating perceptions that his administration was not afraid to stand up to Israel over the issue of West Bank settlements, he might draw an increase in Arab support that could be used to form a more solidified coalition against Iran. Second, he could counter Iranian attempts to hijack the Palestinian cause. Iran's increasingly blatant support for Hamas is designed to call out the hypocrisy of Arab regimes who pledge support for the Palestinians in public for rhetorical reasons, but whose actions are limited by their own strategic concerns. By laying the groundwork rhetorically for greater acceptance of U.S. policy in the region, Obama could strengthen his negotiating position in regard to Iran - or so the theory went.

But by issuing an ultimatum on the West Bank, Obama also invited a confrontation with Israel. From the Israeli point of view, there is no compelling reason to negotiate on the Palestinian issue. The Palestinian territories are divided geographically, politically and ideologically between the Fatah-controlled West Bank and the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip - and because the Palestinian government is in shambles, there is no authority for the Israelis to deal with in the first place. Still, Obama thought it would be worth the risk to raise tensions with Israel if it would advance his agenda in dealing with Iran.

That strategy already had a number of built-in flaws, but its chances of success appear even slimmer in the aftermath of Iran's June 12 presidential election. Obama has been careful in his statements on Iran for good reason. He made it clear before and after the Iranian election that he was prepared to deal with Tehran, regardless of who won the presidency. An exclusive report by the Washington Times on Wednesday reinforced this idea: Prior to the election, Obama was said to have delivered a letter to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei through the Swiss Embassy, reiterating his desire to negotiate. Though Obama recognizes that it would be useless to reject the election victory of someone he would be dealing with anyway, he still faces a significant problem at home. With the right wing stressing the futility of talking to an unchanged Iranian regime and the left wing and human rights groups condemning talks with a regime that violently suppresses protests, he is under pressure to take a tougher stance on Iran. Any attempt at talks with Iran also will be widely viewed in the United States as negotiating with an illegitimate government, given the strong allegations of vote fraud in the election.

The Israelis can see that Obama's diplomatic strategy for Iran - a strategy about which Israel was never really enthused - is rolling toward the gutter. Therefore, the Israelis have an opportunity. Obama previously had tried to pressure Israel over the settlements issue, when he was in a stronger position and knew that Netanyahu would have a heck of a time balancing between the right- and left-wing parties in his own coalition an issue as contentious as the West Bank. Netanyahu first sidestepped the issue with his own peace speech, driving U.S.-Israeli negotiations into the ground by insisting on the right to "natural growth" in the West Bank and the disarmament of the Palestinian territories. Now, Israel sees a U.S. president who is getting hammered at home for his Iran strategy -and whose options on dealing with Iran are dwindling rapidly on the international front.

Obama desperately wants to avoid harsher actions against Iran for fear that Russia will use Iran as a geopolitical lever. The Russians are already hinting privately that they can make the Iran issue more complicated for Washington, through strategic weapons sales, should the Americans fail to meet Moscow's demands in Eurasia. In essence, Obama is fast becoming stuck in the same mess that ensnared a number of presidents before him.

With the U.S. president in a quandary over Iran, Netanyahu has an opportunity to regain the upper hand, pull the settlement issue from the agenda and start pushing his preferred methods of dealing with Iran - including harsher sanctions. Knowing the constraints Washington is facing on the Iran front, Netanyahu at the very least can get Obama to back off on his demands for Israel, but first he has to snap Washington back to attention. This begins with a mini-diplomatic drama over a canceled meeting with a U.S. envoy. Netanyahu likely will be able to generate several more "crises" should he need them, but that all depends on how much strain Israel wants to put on its relationship with the United States at this point.
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