Erich von Manstein was the most respected of the German Field Marshal's during World War II. Once, when Hitler complained that even he could not get the Field Marshal's to follow his orders, what could von Manstein do, he replied his orders were always followed.

Von Manstein started the war as von Rundstedt's Chief of Staff for the invasion of Poland. After the success of the first Blitzkrieg, he retained his staff post when von Rundstedt's Army Group A was moved to the Western front. Von Manstein developed the plan that would lead to the down fall of France, the thrust through the Ardennes to unhinge the French forces and the BEF in northern France, Belgium and Holland. However, the cost was his 'promotion' to Corps Commander 38th Infantry Corps. His Corps was involved in the second phase of the Battle for France, and conducted an exhausting but successful drive into southern France.

While the Battle of Britain raged, his Corps prepared for the Invasion of Britain, which never came. The book covers basic planning activities that should have happened, but which he was not involved in since his removal from a staff post.

In February 1941, he took over command of the 56th Panzer Corps. In the first 5 days of Operation Barbarossa, 56th Panzer Corps covered over 200 miles and captured the Dvina River Bridges intact. The book covers the mobile operations and how his determination to keep the divisions moving provided the only security they needed. When the mobile formations were halted on orders from above, Russian reserves were able to react to the isolated units and launch costly counter attacks. The capture of Leningrad was probably achievable if von Manstein had been allowed to push on.

In September, he was appointed commander of 11th Army in the Crimea. The Crimean battles were almost isolated from the main parts of the Eastern Front. Operating alone, his Army breached the Perekop defences, but was forced to counter a Russian counter offensive. When that was defeated, he turned again and broke through into the Crimea, but was unable to capture Sevastapol. The assault on Sevastapol was halted when Russian forces landed at Kerch at the eastern end of the Crimea. Calling off the attack, he stabilised the position before the Russian winter halted all operations.

Suddenly, in early may he launched a surprise attack on the Russians in the Kerch peninsular. Outnumbered, his mixed German and Rumanian units captured 170,000 prisoners for the loss of only 7,500 men in ten days. Turning back to Sevastapol, the army built up strong artillery forces and resumed the assault on the fortress. He personally devised the plan to ship a battalion across the bay to unhinge the last defenders, although his patrol boat was strafed by a Russian fighter during the Reconnaissance.

Promoted to Field Marshal, 11th Army was sent north with the artillery units to prepare for the assault on Leningrad. However, during the summer of 1942, the German armies were drawn towards Stalingrad, and little of strategic benefit was achieved by 11th Army in the north.

Manstein's HQ was designated Army Group Don on 27th November 1942, tasked with saving 6th Army, preventing the isolation of Army Group A in the Caucasus and restoring the frontline. The book goes into detail on the actions taken by Army Group Don, and how they came so close to linking up with 6th Army. The book puts the reason for the defeat at Stalingrad firmly with Hitler.

One of the best aspects of the book is how, as a senior commander, von Manstein should have been looking at operations and probable developments over a period of weeks and months. Moving divisions between armies and over the long distances of the Eastern Front in winter took time. The Army Group seemed to spend as much time arguing with Hitler who only seemed to look forward three or four days, as they did fighting the Russians.

Von Manstein showed his skills for leadership during these difficult times. The southern armies were held together even after the loss of 6th Army. The book covers the hard decision to ask 6th Army to fight on even as the relief columns were pushed back, to prevent the large Russian encircling armies freedom of action. The need for 6th Army to pin these forces is well covered. On the other end of the scale, his orders to a young Captain to gather tanks from the repair shop next door to fight off a Russian column that had broken through to within a few miles of GHQ is also covered.

After the fall of Stalingrad, the German forces retreated before a counter stroke re-captured Kharkov. This presented options for 1943, which are covered in detail. Operation Citadel is lightly covered. The offensive against Kursk was left to late, and the German forces were unable to break through. From then until his relief on March 30th 1944, von Manstein conducted a fighting retreat behind the various river lines in southern Russia. Again, the book covers the lack of a war plan in detail,and shows how Hitlers constant failure to develop a strategy lead to ongoing friction between commanders and dictator.

Personally, I think this is one of the best books about the Second World War, and anyone interested in the Eastern Front has got to read it.